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THE SCOPE OF INTERDISCIPLINARY
COLLABORATION
J. W. MoHR*
I.

POSITION STATEMENT:

This paper will look at elementary conditions of interdisciplinary collaboration and their implication for research, teaching and practice. All three
phrases are interrelated in terms of the definition and structures of social
problems as well as the dynamics of dealing with them. Teaching at the
university level through the various disciplines provides methodological
approaches to human and social problems, but specialization creates diversity
in orientation, focus, and communication. Since our major intellectual
orientation today is an analytical one (although this is changing), the
intellectual status of a discipline depends on massive reductions of complex
phenomena. Historically, this has led the basic academic disciplines to
engage in incestual relationships (at best selective breeding) and professional
schools - having had a late and ambivalent entry into the house of intellect
to erect a facade of consistency. With the 'natural' sciences (sic!) in the
lead in terms of scientific prestige and resources, their methodologies became
predominant with their undisputed success in the 'objective' realm. Professions
based on them flourished equally. The barber became a surgeon and the
tinkerer an engineer. The humanities and the social sciences became uneasy
if not dis-eased. Academic theology and philosophy, the ancient integrators,
remain at best as narrow specialties.
The position of law is a curious one. Especially in the Anglo-Saxon
countries, its relationship to academia has been tenuous. Its prestige and
success rested mainly on the breakdown of the social significance of theology
and philosophy and the unclaimed spoils of a feudal society (My Lord). It
still presents itself as a unified system (law, lawyers, law teachers, legal
system) which, to the outsider, is a miracle in mystification.
When it comes to problems such as the urban ills and their study, it
does not take long to realize that problems are not neatly divided into
disciplines and that satisfactory understanding cannot by obtained by the
application of one approach and/or one method. But complexity frightens us
because it shakes our identity as professionals and exposes our insufficiency.
In human affairs, the predominant goal is still salvation and the preferred
method panacea. And every human enterprise claims to offer some, if not all
of it. This is not only expressed in the advertising of soap, but in the promotion
of academic insights and skills.
*J. W. Mohr, Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School and Department of Sociology, York
University; Consultant in Forensic Psychiatry, Clark Institute of Psychiatry, Toronto.
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With the increase in the complexity of social organizations as typified
by the modern city (why are truth and banality such close allies?) the
organized and the organic are increasingly in conflict. Every partial solution
tends to increase stresses in related life areas whether they are environmental
(throughways, housing developments), social (poverty programmes) or
psychological (parents are unfit). In principle there will be a high level of
consensus concerning the need for interdisciplinary approaches. There will
be an agreement - at least in this group - that law is involved in all these
areas. There should also be little doubt that Solomon is a rare human
phenomenon and that all the knowledge necessary - let alone wisdom - to
approach complex problems cannot be combined in one person and cannot
be taught in an integrated manner. What are then the conditions that
facilitate mutual supplementation, that allow us to talk to each other and
even understand some of it?
II.

DISCUSSION
Obstacles to Interdisciplinary Collaboration
We have implicitly accepted that interdisciplinary collaboration is, if not

necessarily a good thing, so at least a necessity in urban legal studies. We have,
to some degree, justified this assumption by saying that the problems
encountered do not follow the lines of academic disciplines. Thinking about
this, and considering my scant knowledge in this area and the degree of
expertise which is assembled here, I felt that we might best focus on some
very basic issues of cognitive cohesion, the nature of expertise and the

division of labour. It is only fair to admit right at the outset that many of
the problems that occurred to me in going over these issues arose out of a

dichotomy between conceptualization and experience. This dichotomy is
not only inherent in the subject of teaching, but seems to be one of the
major obstacles in urban planning itself. Jane Jacobs gives one answer to
this dichotomy: "Which avenues of thinking are apt to be useful and to help
yield the truth depends not on how we might prefer to think about a subject,
but rather on the inherent nature of the subject itsef."' I accept this principle
without equivocation, most likely because it fits the intellectual tradition I have
imbibed as well as adopted beginning with Husserl's shibboleth 'Back to the
Things Themselves!'. But, the simplicity of the statement is deceptive.
Husserl already raises the two basic questions: "How can we be sure that
cognition accords with the things as they exist in themselves, that it gets "at
them"? What do things in themselves care about our ways of thinking and the
logical rules governing them?"'2 I see that I have already talked myself into
the first point I was going to make which concerns the cognitive substructure
of interdisciplinary collaboration.
I Jacobs, J. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. Random House, 1961,
p. 428.
2Husserl, E. The Idea of Phenomenology. Martinus Nijhof, The Hague, 1964, p. 1.
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Problems of Cognition

The basic propositions are, or seem to be, clear. Anything that humans
relate to, partakes of their own complexity. 3 We are rarely satisfied by having
water explained as H20, since this formula does not seem to say anything
about the vicissitudes of thirst, of enjoying the sun's play on water or of being
drenched. On the other hand, we are well aware that if we should keep all
these things in mind at the same time, science - at least as we know it would be impossible. Chemistry became what it is because it extracted itself
from the questions of alchemy, questions which are all but forgotten, but
which nevertheless supplied the energy for the enterprise. Reduction is the
power of cognition, a fact of which the dreamer Descartes, who helped leading
us up this garden path, must have been well aware. By reduction I do not
mean here just simplification in a structural sense, but partialization of human
questions. And the step from reduction to reductionism, it seems to me, occurs
most commonly and particularly at the point at which the results of the
analysis of partialized and objectified questions are assumed to be directly
applicable to human problems.
Scientists have always attempted, even if only halfheartedly, to keep their
enterprise "pure" and to leave the application of their results to others. I
could never understand the distinction between "pure"' and "applied!' research
since there did not seem to be any scientific logic for it, until I learned to see
that this is not an intellectual distinction but a political one. The "pure!'
scientist divests himself of his social responsibility. Now he may have good
reasons for doing so in the interest of science or simply in order to get on with
his job. The innocence which is claimed, however, can by now only be in
the nature of bad faith.4 At best, scientific innocence has kicked us out of the
heavens and reduced us to a naked ape and at worst it threatens us with
extinction. Why in this light we should persist in studies, urban-legal or
otherwise, and talk about the scope of interdisciplinary collaboration would
be mystifying were it not for the fatal fact that we cannot un-know or disknow. We simply cannot go back home again, we can only go on to know
more and hope for the best.
Looking at Academia, one can easily discern that the more "objective"
(which simply means object oriented) a discipline became, the more powerful
were its methods and its results. This worked well for those disciplines which
could isolate objects out of the fabric of the quest for human meaning.
Since nothing succeeds like success and since most of our practical reasoning
is based on analogy, imitation was persued with a vengeance. If one looks at
something like the 'Analysis for the Advancement of Learning Human and
Divine' by Bacon and compares it with the structure of our universities today,
one realizes what has happened. 5 But, again, there is no turning back. There
can only be a struggle for perspective. We cannot eliminate cause and effect
3 O'Neill, J. Authority and the Body Politic. Paper, Five-State Philosophy Conference, Clemson University, S.C., March 7-8, 1969.
4 Mohr, J. W. "Innocence, Responsibility and Perspective: Some Thoughts on a
Research Programme," CanadianWelfare, 19/2, April 1967.
5 Bacon, F. The Advancement of Learning. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1926, p. 74.
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models from the social sciences nor concepts like averages or probability. We
can only recognize their limitations when they are applied to human situations.
Some lessons for interdisciplinary studies seem to emerge. When we
deal with a phenomenon like the city, which is a form of relationship between
man and his world, there is hardly any discipline that does not have a bearing
on it. It is not only impossible to integrate all these sciences in terms of their
conceptual diversities, it is also impossible to find a rank order of loading.
This can only be determined by value system which cannot be derived from
the sciences themselves. Whether the model is a civitas dei or a zoo it will
have shortcomings for humans who (on the average and with a high level of
probability) want to range from one to the other.
Since law presumably is the formal regulation of conduct between
human beings and their institutions, this regulation (again presumably) should
be as close to the actual conduct as possible. Quantity and diversity has
taken much of this conduct out of eye-level observation, and the rate of social
change makes new regulations necessary in ever-increasing numbers. The
effects and results of these regulations are again largely beyond eye-level
accounting. The politics of experience becomes largely the politics of data
and 'the case', often atypical in the first place, will no longer do even as a
measurement of the outside limits of manoeuvre. We are thus forced to look
for method and measurement provided by various sciences. Political science
has long been a part of this scene, but was short on measurements; economics
has perhaps been most successful in entering the public domain, although
some interpret this as a sell-out, and recently psychology, sociology and their
various hybrids have made increasing claims of being able to elucidate public
behaviour. The amateur and the dilettante (who by definition love and
enjoy what they are doing) are fighting a hopeless rearguard action. Living
has become serious business - of a kind.
If it has not been already obvious before, it should be clear now that we
have partly slid and partly talked ourselves into a complex situation to which
each discipline has - or at least claims to have - some part answer.
Academia has become important in the public domain. The least we can do
is try and find out what we have in mind before we peddle our wares. The
student who, by necessity, has to be misled into segmental knowledge has to
recognize its limitations. No one discipline can do this of and by itself. There
is a need of an adversary or inquisitional system, otherwise we become
menacing experts.
b.

Problemsof Expertise
Recurrent jokes about the expert, if nothing else, leads one to think
that there is a general uneasiness about people who know better how we
should live than we do ourselves. We commonly contend that a little
knowledge is dangerous, but we tend to forget that everybody has only a little
knowledge and consequently is dangerous. And the more decisive this
knowledge becomes the more dangerous it is. This has been so since the
beginning of time as Genesis will tell us. However, we did not leave it to
the expert then and have suffered by it. And so we have been looking for
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substitute experts ever since. We still suffer; yet we cannot do without them,
they have become an addiction. Which leads me to an illustration.
In a recent seminar with postgraduates in psychiatry, a number of
participants adamantly maintained that the major contribution of psychiatry
was not in the field of social psychiatry (which I happened to represent) but
in the field of chemo-therapy. Now, I have no doubt that the 'wonder drugs',
as they were called if you remember, have helped a number of people to
carry on their lives and stay out of institutions. Expertise has paid off. One
need not question the value of these drugs along the lines of Ron Laing or
Thomas Szasz, although they cannot be ignored. 6 What concerned me was
that the students' claim was made without looking at the associated total
social costs from tranquilized housewife to crazed "speed" freak. As
science was not able to contain its achievements, neither were the professions.
Jane Jacobs gives innumerable examples of this kind of 'splitting' of
specific results and side effects which I am sure are all familiar to you.7
Daniel Moynihan in his recent swan song of community action in the war on
poverty complains that - 'the divergence of the various theories was such
that what would serve to cure in one case would exacerbate in the other.
A big bet was being made. No responsible person had any business acting as
if it were a sure thing.'8 He contends that key decisions were made by
lawyers and economists who were unfamiliar with social science theories on
which various programmes were based. He seems to believe that we can
extricate ourselves from such dilemmas by limiting the social sciences. "The
role of social science lies not in the formation of social policy but in the
measurement of its results" (his italics).9 How one avoids these measurements
becoming theoretical constructs and the basis for future policy he does not say.
Presumably this is why one measures effects in the first place. He himself
recognizes later that "the 'movement of the social system into self - consciousness' has been accompanied by increasingly sophisticated efforts to shape and
direct that system. Increasingly social scientists are recruited for such
attempts; increasingly they themselves initiate them".' 0 He then looks to
answers in professional ethics, but this of course will not do. Even older
professions who have a pretty good record of ethical practice in terms of their
own internal consistency have an outright lousy record in terms of social
policies. Expertise is power and no institutionalized group can be trusted to
limit their power of their own accord. There is a need for understanding
the vicissitudes of social science research and the expertise that can be
derived from it on the part of the legislator, policy maker, draftsman of
regulations, the courts and partisan counsel in practice.
Although of recent vintage - at least in this country - it is fairly well
accepted by now that the behavioural and social sciences have a place in
6 Laing, R. D. The Politics of Experience. Penguin Books, 1967.
Szasz, T. S. The Myth of Mental Illness. Harper, 1961.
7 Jacobs, I. The Death and Life of GreatAmerican Cities. Random House, 1961.
8
Moynihan, D. P. Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding. The Free Press, 1969,
p. 171.
9 Moynihan, p. 193.

10 Moynihan, p. 201.
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legal studies. It is not at all clear, nor should it be at this time, what their
place is and how they relate to teaching, research and practice. There is
considerable concern about bastardisation and ambivalence about what it
might do to THE LAW. It is interesting to listen to the rhetoric that develops.
The law and the teaching of it is described as: hardheaded, tough, clearly
analytical, demanding, precise, rigorous, practical, sensible, balanced and
purposeful. There is clearly a masculine image which social scientists can
always translate as: rigid, pedantic, aggressive, moralistic, punitive, trivial,
static, artificial and sterile."
c.

The Division of Labour

It is interesting to note that Durkheim's argument in his 'Division of
Labour in Society' is mainly based on notions of law and theories of sanctions.
In the preface to the second edition he adds 'Some Notes on Occupational
Groups' where he says: '.

..

We have especially insisted on showing that the

division of labour cannot be held responsible as is sometimes unjustly
charged; that it does not necessarily produce dispersion and incoherence, but
that functions when they are sufficiently in contact with one another tend to
stabilize and regulate themselves'. This principle is good enough for academic
collaboration although, as Durkheim points out, it is not sufficient for society
as a whole. 'A moral or juridical regulation essentially expresses, then, social
needs that society alone can feel; it rests in a state of opinion, and all opinion
is a collective thing produced by collective elaboration. ' 2
In terms of study and research, the problem of division of labour
between disciplines could be seen as a relatively simple one. We may return
to our initial proposition and say that the subject or question itself should
determine the methods needed for their exploration. The only trouble is that
this already presupposes an awareness of methods and areas of knowledge as
the question unfolds. And this obviously brings us to teaching. Having taken
a very cursory look at the intellectual complexity of the various scientific
disciplines which might have a bearing on legal problems, what could
profitably be done in terms of teaching? Obviously very little, since each
discipline has its own slate of courses and its voluminous literature, an abridgement of which only breeds superficiality. And yet, the situation is not entirely
hopeless if we think in terms of learning rather than teaching. The accumulation of organized and pre-digested knowledge is a sterile affair in any case
until it is applied to a fresh, concrete and living problem. And there is no
dearth of fresh, concrete and living problems as far as I can see nor could I
foresee a time when this would be the case.
I am frankly appalled when students who have already spent three to
six years at the university still do not know what their questions are. I say
'still' and yet I am not sure it was not those years that made them forget their
questions. When one attempts to dig up these questions from under the
rubble of knowledge one finds that they were big ones and could never be
11 Mehl, P. E. Clinical vs. StatisticalPrediction. University of Minnesota Press, 1964.
12 Durkheim, E. The Division of Labor in Society. The Free Press, 1964, pp. 4, 5.

1970]

Urban Legal Studies Symposium

dealt with in the span of a term essay, a paper or even a thesis. It sometimes
seems like castration on the installment plan. As one only can honestly teach
what one has found necessary and useful in one's own quest so can the student
only meaningfully accept what relates to his world and his questions. All we
can really do is to sensitize the student to the possibilities that are around for
solving real or imaginary problems. The difference between the two can only
be a question of outcome.
With this in mind, one does not really have to worry about practice
even if one did know what the student was exactly gobig to do later on, which
in terms of law graduates one cannot be sure. In any event, much of the
knowledge and specific techniques that we may impart is bound to be outdated
in a few years and their stringent inculcation may retard rather than enhance
further develojments. Interdisciplinary collaboration and the learning that
flows from it can create an openness and a flexibility which is increasingly
needed and can never be outdated if it becomes an attitude and style of life.
Much of what has been said so far is largely a thing of the past. The
division of labour between disciplines depends more and more on who does
what where, at what time. This expresses itself in the proliferation of institutes
and centers and the names of loose groupings such as life sciences or health
sciences. Departments which still carry a traditional name such as psychology
may share little more than the name from place to place. Professional schools
equally recognize that to remain in the forefront of where the action is they have
to respond to new intellectual developments and social needs rather than
servicing their profession as they have known it. There is hope that, with the
increasing social awareness, man and his way of being in the world will move
to the centre of our studies which, by this very movement, will become
ipso facto interdisciplinary.

